We study a method for key predistribution in a network of users where pairwise keys are computed by hashing users' IDs along with secret information that has been (pre)distributed to the network users by a trusted entity. A communication graph can be speci ed to indicate which pairs of users should be able to compute keys. We determine necessary and su cient conditions for schemes of this type to be secure. We also consider the problem of minimizing the storage requirements of such a scheme; we are interested in the total storage as well as the maximum storage required by any user. Minimizing the total storage is NP-hard, whereas minimizing the maximum storage required by a user can be computed in polynomial time.
Introduction
Suppose we have a network of users and we want every pair of users to have a secure pairwise key. When keying information is distributed "ahead of time" by a trusted authority, we have a key predistribution scheme, or KPS. The trivial KPS assigns − 1 distinct pairwise keys to each user, so we say that each user has storage equal to − 1. The total storage in the trivial scheme is ( − 1), since each of the users has storage equal to − 1. Assuming the pairwise keys are chosen independently and uniformly at random from a speci ed keyspace, the trivial scheme is secure against (maximum size) coalitions of size − 2, since each pairwise key is known only to two participants and cannot be computed even if all the remaining − 2 participants collude.
An interesting way to reduce the storage requirement, as compared to the trivial scheme, is to use a Blom scheme [3] . The Blom scheme incorporates a security parameter denoted by ; pairwise keys are unconditionally secure against coalitions of up to users. Each user's storage requirement in the Blom scheme is + 1 and this storage requirement is shown to be optimal by Blundo et al. [4] .
Another approach, due to Lee and Stinson [7] , is called an ID-based one-way-function key predistribution scheme, also known as IOS. Here, pairwise keys are computed by hashing public information along with secret information. This technique can be used to construct a secure scheme in which every pair of users has a pairwise key. Here we obtain security against maximum size coalitions, but the security depends on the hash function used to construct the keys. We will assume that the hash function can be modelled as a random function, i.e., the security analysis will be done in the standard random oracle model [2] . The storage requirement of this scheme is reduced by almost half as compared to the trivial scheme. In [5] , a very similar scheme was described that has the same storage requirement as IOS.
It is also possible to consider a more general setting where we specify a communication graph consisting of all the pairs of users who we want to be able to share a secret key. A trivial KPS for a given communication graph would assign deg( ) keys to vertex , for every vertex in , where deg( ) denotes the degree of vertex . In the case of unconditionally secure schemes secure against coalitions of size , Blundo et al. [4] gave a construction where a vertex has storage requirement min{ + 1, deg( )}, for every vertex . Lee and Stinson's construction [7] applies to regular graphs of even degree ; the storage requirement for each vertex is 1 + /2.
. Our contributions
In Section 1.2, we introduce some graph-theoretic terminology and basic results that are required later in the paper. In Section 2, we de ne a general model for IOS for a speci ed communication graph . In Section 2.1, we determine necessary and su cient conditions for an IOS to be secure. Our characterization of secure IOS involves certain key graphs. We then use our characterization of secure IOS to investigate the storage requirements of the these types of schemes. We show in Section 2.2 that it is su cient to restrict our attention to schemes obtained by decomposing the edges of the communication graph into "stars". In Section 3.1, we investigate how to minimize the total storage in the scheme. In general, this turns out to be equivalent to determining the size of a maximum independent set of vertices in , which is an NP-hard problem. For complete graphs, however, it is easy to give an exact answer. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we turn to the problem of minimizing the maximum storage required by any vertex of . We give a complete solution for regular graphs. For arbitrary graphs, we can show that the optimal maximum storage can be determined in polynomial time by exploiting a connection with the minimum maximum indegree problem. In Section 4, we discuss our results in comparison to the recent paper by Choi, Acharya and Gouda [5] .
In an ID-based one-way-function key predistribution scheme (or IOS), pairwise keys are constructed by hashing public information along with secret information. We describe a general model for IOS for a given communication graph = ( , ) on vertices. We identify the vertices in with a set of users, say U. Our rst goal is to obtain a KPS in which two users , ∈ U have a pairwise key , whenever { , } ∈ . Security of the scheme will be addressed in Section 2.1.
Let : ( ) → {1, . . . , } be a publicly known surjective function and let 1 , . . . , ∈ {0, 1} be secret values chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} . Let ℎ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a hash function (which we model as a random oracle). The length of the 's, namely , is the same as the length of the output of ℎ. A suitable value for is = 128. The function ℎ will be used as a key derivation function.
Every pairwise key , will be computed as
where (1) for every ∈ U, ID( ) denotes public identifying information for user , and (2) < (this requirement ensures that , = , in (1)). Suppose a value ({ , }) is not known to a coalition of users. Recall that ({ , }) was chosen uniformly at random from a set of size 2 . Also, the key , is the output of a random function ℎ that takes on values from a set of size 2 . Therefore this key can be regarded as a secure -bit key.
Eventually, we will investigate whether secret values may be "repeated", i.e., used for the computation of more than one key, without compromising security. The motivation is that this might enable the storage of the scheme to be reduced. This question will be addressed in Section 2.1. Remark 2.1. As described above, the public inputs to the hash function are taken to be (public) IDs. Actually, it doesn't really matter what the public inputs to ℎ are, as long as there do not exist two keys that have the same public and secret inputs and we ensure that , = , .
It is obvious that if { , } ∈ and ({ , }) = , then users and each must store one of or , . We will assume that neither nor stores both and , , since , can be computed if is known.
De nition 2.2. For 1 ≤ ≤ , de ne
and let be the vertices spanned by . ( , ) is a graph that we term the th key graph. Let = { ∈ : stores } and de ne W = ( 1 , . . . , ). Since we are assuming that is surjective, it follows that | | ≥ 1 and | | ≥ 2 for all ∈ {1, . . . , }. An IOS is fully speci ed by and W, so we will refer to ( , W) as a -IOS.
To summarize, here is all the keying information that is stored in a -IOS ( , W). Suppose ∈ is any vertex and { , } ∈ is any edge that is incident with . If { , } ∈ , then the vertex stores when ∈ , and it stores , , otherwise. Then it is easy to see that
The keying material held by each user is as follows: . Secure IOS Suppose that ( , W) is a -IOS. We say that ( , W) is secure if there does not exist a user who can compute a key , where { , } ∈ and ̸ = , . This security condition will be satis ed provided that does not know either of the values or , (where = ({ , })). Note that a secure IOS is automatically secure against maximum size coalitions.
We now consider when a -IOS, as de ned above, will be secure. We prove a sequence of simple lemmas that culminate in a characterization of secure -IOS. The rst lemma is obvious. 
is a secure -IOS and , ∈ . Then the key graph consists of a single edge { , }. 
The above conditions are necessary for a -IOS, say ( , W), to be secure; we now show that they are also su cient to provide security. Proof. These three conditions are shown to be necessary for ( , W) to be secure in Lemmas 2.8-2.10. We now show they are su cient for the scheme to be secure. Suppose the three conditions hold but ( , W) is not secure. We will obtain a contradiction. If ( , W) is not secure, then some user ̸ = , can compute a key , where { , } ∈ . Let ({ , }) = .
Since does not store , (Lemma 2.4), it follows from Lemma 2.5 that ∈ and hence | | ≥ 1. Applying Lemma 2.9, we have that | | = 1 or 2.
Suppose | | = 2. Clearly , , ∈ and hence | | ≥ 3. This contradicts Lemma 2.8 which says that consists of a single edge.
Suppose | | = 1 (so = { }). From Lemma 2.10, it follows that is a star with centre . But then the existence of the edge { , } ∈ yields a contradiction.
It may be helpful to summarize the cases enumerated in Theorem 2.11 in more descriptive language. We will say that the th key graph is of type if | | = . Then Theorem 2.11 can be restated by saying that every key graph is of type 0, 1 or 2. Furthermore, the structure of a key graph of a speci ed type is as follows: type 0 In a key graph ( , ) of type 0, no vertex in stores the value . Hence, for every vertex ∈ and every edge { , } ∈ that is incident with , the vertex stores the key , . There is no restriction on the number of edges in or the structure of . type 1 A key graph ( , ) of type 1 is a star whose centre (say ) stores the value . Any leaf ∈ stores the key , . type 2 A key graph ( , ) of type 2 consists of a single edge { , } where and both store the value . 
. Edge-decompositions into stars
We say that a (secure) -IOS ( , W) is a star-IOS if every key graph is of type 1. That is, the KPS is based on an edge-decomposition of into stars. This was the model introduced by Lee and Stinson [7] . In this section, we show that any secure -IOS can be transformed into a (secure) -star-IOS in which the storage of each vertex is the same in the two schemes.
Basically, we need to describe how to change type 0 and 2 key graphs into type 1 key graphs. Let's begin by considering a type 2 key graph, say ( , ), which consists of single edge { , }. Both vertices and store . If we stipulate that one of the vertices or stores and the other one stores , , then has been transformed to a type 1 key graph with the same storage requirements. Now we suppose we have a type 0 key graph, ( , ) . No vertex in stores the value . In this case, we can split this key graph into | | key graphs of type 1, each of which is isomorphic to 1,1 . Every edge is now assigned a di erent random value by the function . Furthermore, for every edge = { , } ∈ , one endpoint stores the (new) random value ( ) and the other endpoint stores the (new) key , .
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.13. If ( , W) is a secure -IOS, then there exists a secure -star-KPS in which the storage of every vertex is the same in both schemes.
Optimal storage of IOS
In this section, we focus on secure -IOS that have minimum possible storage requirements. In view of Theorem 2.13, we can restrict our attention to -star-IOS. We are interested in the total storage required in such a scheme, as well as the (maximum) storage required by an individual user.
. Total storage Let = ( , ) be a graph with | | = and | | = . Suppose that ( , W) is a secure -star-IOS. Then the storage requirement of a node , denoted ( ), is de ned to be the number of stars (i.e., key graphs) that contain .
The total storage requirement of the IOS, denoted by ( , W), is de ned as
Let ( ) denote the number of stars for which is the centre and let ℓ( ) denote the number of stars for which is a leaf. Then ( ) = ( ) + ℓ( )
and hence ( , W) = ∈ ( ( ) + ℓ( )).
If we de ne = ∈ ( ), then we have that
Example 3.1. In Example 2.3, we have the following storage requirements:
( ) ℓ( ) ( )   1 1  1  2  2 0  3  3  3 1  1  2  4 0  3  3  5 1  0  1 The total storage of the scheme is 11.
We now consider each star in the edge-decomposition to be directed as de ned in De nition 1.9, i.e., each edge is directed from the leaf to the centre of the star containing it.
Proof. It is obvious that ℓ( ) = + ( ) (i.e., the outdegree of ). Clearly ∑ ∈ + ( ) = , and the result follows.
It follows from (3) and Lemma 3.2 that ( , W) = + .
Further, it is easy to see that ( ) = 0 if − ( ) = 0, and ( ) ≥ 1 if − ( ) > 0.
We are interested in minimizing the total storage. We will denote by * ( ) the minimum value of ( , W) over all secure -star-IOS. In order to compute * ( ), we need to minimize the value of in (4) . It is convenient to let min ( ) denote the minimum possible value of over all edge-decompositions of into stars. Proof. Let 0 be a set of independent vertices in . Direct all edges that are incident with a vertex ∈ 0 away from , and direct any remaining edges arbitrarily. This shows that min ≤ − .
Conversely, observe that the set of vertices for which ( ) = 0 forms an independent set in . This yields the bound min ≥ − . Further, in order for this bound to be met with equality, ( ) ≤ 1 for all vertices . Example 3.5. For the graph considered in Example 2.3, it is easy to see that = 2. Theorem 3.4 then yields * ( ) = 11. The scheme constructed in Example 2.3 has total storage 11, as noted in Example 3.1. Therefore this scheme has optimal total storage.
We now consider the situation where is a complete graph . The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.4; it improves the constructions given in [5, 7] by one. It is well known that computing the exact value of ( ) is NP-hard. Thus we also have the following corollary of Theorem 3.4. 
. Maximum storage
It is also of interest to consider the maximum storage of a secure -IOS, say ( , W), which is de ned to be max ( , W) = max{ ( ) : ∈ }. De ne * max ( ) to be the minimum value of max ( , W) over all ( , W) that are secure -IOS. As before, we can restrict our attention to ( , W) that are secure -star-IOS.
We begin with a lemma that states a simpli cation we can make without loss of generality. Lemma 3.8. For any graph , there exists a secure -IOS having optimal maximum storage * max ( ) in which ( ) ∈ {0, 1} for all vertices .
Proof. Consider the star-decomposition associated with a secure -IOS having optimal maximum storage * max ( ). If ( ) > 1 for some vertex , then merge all the stars having centre . This reduces the storage ( ) and leaves the storage of all other vertices unchanged. Repeat this process until ( ) ∈ {0, 1} for all vertices .
We next give a construction that yields an upper bound on * ( ). This is a slight modi cation of a construction given by Lee and Stinson [7] that only applied to regular graphs of even degree. if is odd, +2 2 if is even.
Proof. We rst assume that is connected. Let 0 ⊆ be the vertices in that have odd degree. Clearly | 0 | is even. Let be any matching of the vertices in 0 ; consists of | 0 |/2 disjoint edges. Now consider the multigraph ὔ = ( , ὔ = ∪ ). Every vertex in ὔ has even degree, so ὔ has a (directed) eulerian circuit, say .
The important property is that, with respect to this orientation de ned on the edges in ὔ , + ( ) = − ( ) for every vertex . Now remove the edges in and consider the resulting orientation on the edges in . We have | − ( ) − + ( )| ≤ 1 if ( ) is odd and − ( ) = + ( ) if ( ) is even. This orientation gives rise to an associated decomposition of into stars, where each star consists of the edges directed into a vertex.
To complete the proof, we observe that any vertex has storage
If is even, then − ( ) ≤ /2 for all , and if is odd, then − ( ) ≤ ( + 1)/2 for all . The desired result follows. If is not connected, then apply the above-described technique to every connected component of .
If we start with a regular graph degree at least two, then we can show that the result obtained above is optimal.
Theorem 3.10. Let = ( , ) be regular graph of degree ≥ 2. Then * max ( ) = ( + 2)/2.
Proof. We have that * ( ) = + − . Here = /2 since is -regular. Therefore, * max ( ) ≥ ⌈ + − ⌉ = ⌈1 + 2 − ⌉.
Since 1 ≤ < , it follows that * max ( ) ≥ 1 + /2. We have * max ( ) ≤ 1 + /2 from Theorem 3.9, so the result follows.
For regular graphs of odd degree, we have the following similar result. In any -regular graph, we have ≤ /2 from Theorem 1.11. Therefore * max ( ) ≥ ⌈1 + 2 − /2 ⌉ ≥ ⌈1 + − 1 2 ⌉ = + 1 2 .
Now, in order for this bound to be met with equality, it must happen that = = /2 and the total storage * ( ) = ( + 1)/2. In this case there will be /2 vertices with ( ) = 1 and /2 vertices with ( ) = . So * max ( ) = . However, ( + 1)/2 < when ≥ 3, so we have a contradiction. Therefore, * max ( ) ≥ ( + 1)/2 + 1 = ( + 3)/2.
Then * max ( ) ≤ ( + 3)/2 from Theorem 3.9, so the result follows.
Remark 3.12. A 1-regular graph is a union of disjoint edges. It is easy to see that * max ( ) = 1 for such a graph .
. Minimizing maximum indegree and outdegree
The problem of computing * max ( ) is closely related to the minimum maximum indegree problem [6, 9] , which is de ned as follows. Given a graph , the goal is to direct the edges in so as to minimize the maximum indegree of a vertex of the resulting directed graph. Suppose we denote this quantity by MMI( ). It was shown in [9] that MMI( ) can be computed in polynomial time, more speci cally in time ( 2 ), where is the number of edges in the graph. An improved algorithm can be found in [1] . These algorithms also nd an orientation attaining the optimal value MMI( ).
We will use the following simple result a bit later. Proof. Given any orientation of the edges of a graph , the average indegree is / .
We can analogously de ne the minimum maximum outdegree problem and the associated quantity MMO( ) in the obvious way. Observe that MMO( ) = MMI( ), simply by reversing the directions of all edges in an optimal solution.
Here is our result linking maximum storage of a -IOS to MMO( ). Proof. Suppose we have a star-decomposition of that minimizes * max ( ) and suppose that all edges are directed towards the centres of the stars in the decomposition, as usual. From (2) , the storage of a vertex is ( ) = ℓ( ) + ( ). The value ℓ( ) is clearly equal to the outdegree of . From Lemma 3.8, we can assume (0) = 0 or 1. The result follows.
We expect for "most" graphs that * max ( ) = MMO( ) + 1. The only way it can occur that MMO( ) = * max ( ) is if every vertex whose outdegree is equal to MMO( ) has indegree equal to 0. Nevertheless, this can occur: we show that there are in nitely many graphs for which MMO( ) = * max ( ). Proof. For any integer > 10, let = 5 ∨ (i.e., is the join of 5 and a set of independent vertices; see De nition 1.13). This graph has = + 5 vertices and = 5 + 10 edges. From Lemma 3.13, since > 10, we see that MMO( ) ≥ 5. We can construct an orientation of the edges of in which the vertices in the each have outdegree 5 and indegree 0, and the vertices in the 5 each have outdegree 2 and indegree + 2. This shows that MMO( ) ≤ 5, whence MMO( ) = 5. Since the vertices of outdegree 5 all have indegree equal to 0, the resulting star-decomposition proves that * max ( ) = MMO( ) = 5. Since MMO( ) can be computed in polynomial time, Theorem 3.14 establishes that we can compute an integer such that * max ( ) = or + 1, in polynomial time. In fact, as we now show, it is possible to compute the exact value of * max ( ) in polynomial time. Proof. Suppose MMO( ) = * max ( ) and consider an orientation of the edges in so that the maximum outdegree of any vertex is MMO( ). Let ∈ ; then has indegree greater than 0. It follows that ( ) = 1 + ℓ( ), where ℓ( ) equals the outdegree of . Therefore ℓ( ) < ( ) ≤ * max ( ) = MMO( ).
Since this holds for every vertex ∈ , we have MMO( ) < MMO( ). Conversely, suppose that MMO( ) < MMO( ). Consider an orientation of the edges in so that the maximum outdegree of any vertex in is at most MMO( ). Next, direct any edges having one endpoint in towards the incident vertex in . At this point, we have Further, = and hence * max ( ) = 3. Thus the scheme constructed in Example 2.3 has optimal maximum storage.
Example 3.18. In the construction given in the proof of Theorem 3.15, we see that consists of the ve vertices in the 5 and hence MMO( ) = 2.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.16, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute * max ( ): Remark 3.19. Using ideas from the proof of Theorem 3.16, the above algorithm can be modi ed in a straightforward way to construct a scheme attaining the value * max ( ).
Discussion and summary
We have studied a general type of key redistribution scheme based on hashing secret values along with users' IDs. We gave necessary and su cient conditions for schemes of this type to be secure, and we studied the problem of minimizing users' storage in these schemes.
Choi, Acharya and Gouda [5] also studied key predistribution in a similar setting. They only considered the situation where the communication graph is a complete graph and they gave a construction that is basically equivalent to the one found in [7] . They also considered lower bounds on the total storage of schemes of this type. Their model is very similar to ours, but they do not assume (as we did) that the key derivation function is a random oracle. In [5, Theorem 6] , it is stated that the total storage required by a secure scheme is at least ( − 1)/2. The proof involves analyzing the implications of an equation of the form ( , ) = ( , ),
where is a public key derivation function, and are public values, and and are secret values known to nodes and , respectively. The equation (5) ensures that nodes and will compute the same pairwise key. Moreover, it is assumed and are each used for the computation of at least one other key, and then a contradiction is derived. It is observed in [7] that, under these circumstances, it should be infeasible to compute given and ( , ), and it should also be infeasible to compute given and ( , ). It is then claimed that this means that values and satisfying (5) cannot be computed when the scheme is set up. However, this last assertion does not seem to consider the possibility that the entity that sets up the scheme can compute these values, even though the nodes and might not be able to compute or , respectively. The Blom scheme [3] illustrates how this can happen. For simplicity, we consider a Blom scheme secure against individual nodes. Such a scheme is constructed by a trusted authority (TA) rst choosing a symmetric polynomial of the form ( 1 , 2 ) = + ( 1 + 2 ) + 1 2 . A node is given the polynomial ( ) = ( , ) and is given the polynomial ( ) = ( , ). The pairwise key for nodes and is ( , ) = ( , ). Node computes this key as ( ) and node computes ( ). Note that node cannot compute and node cannot compute , but the TA who sets up the scheme knows the relationship between these polynomials.
In the setting we studied, where the key derivation function is a random oracle, equation (5) will not hold, so the above discussion does not apply. We were therefore able to prove stronger lower bounds on the total storage, as we presented in Section 3.
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